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Abstract 
Violence and human rights violations in putatively internal armed 
conflicts often involve significant cross-border dimensions.  Yet the 
transitional justice mechanisms that respond to past atrocities have 
generally been undertaken in national or international institutions and 
focus primarily on offenses within a single state and primarily by 
national actors of that state. Despite the proliferation of transitional 
justice mechanisms, they have generally not been designed or utilized 
to address transboundary or regionalized abuses.  The result has been 
significant inconsistencies in practice, with some crimes addressed 
and others ignored, creating zones of impunity. In this article, we 
explore the relative absence of regional transitional justice 
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1 The authors are grateful to Johanna Herman for her helpful comments.  This 
paper was originally developed for a project organized by Kirsten Campbell of the 
University of London, Goldsmiths, on “A More Secure World? Humanitarian Law 
and the Prevention and Regulation of Contemporary Armed Conflict” with a grant 
from the Economic and Social Research Council.  The authors would like to thank 
Dr. Campbell and the participants in a conference for the project for their 
comments.  Any errors are of course ours alone. 
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mechanisms, and consider how regional approaches have been used 
to promote conflict resolution and might be used to shape 
accountability processes as well.  Drawing on the experiences of 
Central America and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we argue 
that the potential for regional approaches is as yet untested but merits 
closer consideration. 
 
Introduction 
In the past two decades there has been a proliferation of mechanisms 
to address serious violations of international human rights and 
international humanitarian law.    These mechanisms, broadly termed 
‘transitional justice mechanisms,’ have been developed at the local, 
national, and international levels, and in certain instances as explicitly 
‘hybrid’—combining international and local elements.  Debates about 
the efficacy of particular mechanisms in a range of places have 
focused on how the location of such efforts impacts the outcomes—
both in terms of place (i.e. truth commission or tribunal) and level 
(e.g. national or international). Recent scholarship has demonstrated 
the interest in ‘global’ and ‘local’ aspects of transitional justice.2 We 
seek to expand this analysis through the consideration of the 
strengths and weaknesses of possible regionalized approaches to past 
human rights abuses.   This consideration is necessarily speculative, in 
the absence of concrete regional transitional justice mechanisms to 
date, but draws upon an examination of past regional initiatives for 
conflict management and resolution.  In this article, we ask: where 
and how might ‘regional’ transitional justice mechanisms be 
appropriate, particularly for transnational violations of human rights?  
 Accountability mechanisms often are shaped by choices made 
by states internally, including situations in which states consent to the 
jurisdiction of relevant international judicial bodies.  However, when 
decisions about accountability are left to national political leaders, 
violations of many human rights abuses committed by perpetrators 
 
2 See, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Special Issue: Whose Justice? Global 
and Local Approaches to Transitional Justice, Guest Editor, Kimberly Theiden, 
November 2009.  
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still in power often go unpunished. This trend is exacerbated by 
choices made during peace negotiations, when pragmatic and 
strategic compromises often override obligations to punish certain 
crimes.  Amnesties, pardons, and (generally) silence regarding abuses 
have been more common than judicial processes. The need to strike 
deals involving pardons and amnesties for the sake of national 
conflict resolution often exists in tension with demands for 
accountability for past abuses.3  
 Furthermore, although international tribunals have 
proliferated, the terrain of international criminal accountability 
remains profoundly uneven. In particular, (and as we have discussed 
elsewhere) the regional dimensions of many conflicts contribute to a 
complex web of crimes in which combatants, refugees, resources and 
weapons cross borders, but peace agreements and accountability 
processes often address only the crimes committed on the territory 
of, or by the nationals of, one state.  4   This, we have argued 
elsewhere, creates zones of impunity.5 Violence may become 
transnational where refugee populations fleeing violence or armed 
groups use neighboring countries as camps or bases, or where 
neighboring states have overt and/or covert involvement in violence 
in another state.  While many conflicts and attendant human rights 
abuses are regionalized, involving multiple countries, most peace 
agreements and accountability processes are developed for single 
states in isolation, creating a patchwork of accountability, whereby 
complex regionalized crimes are treated differently by individual 
countries and/or international processes.  As we have explored these 
processes and the resultant  ‘impunity gap’ in great detail in an earlier 
article, we focus here on the possibilities  for regional initiatives 
 
3 An extensive literature addresses the choices in transition—see e.g. Jose 
Zalaquett,  “Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma 
of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations,” in Hastings Law 
Journal, vol. 43 (1992).  
4 Chandra Lehka  Sriram and Amy Ross “Geographies of crime and justice: 
contemporary transitional justice and the creation of zones of impunity,”  
International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 1, issue 1 (2007): 45-65. 
5 Ibid.   
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involving transitional justice accountability mechanisms, including 
individual criminal responsibility.  
 In considering the options for possible regional transitional 
justice mechanisms, we wish both to address the role of the ‘region,’ 
and to expand the debate concerning the appropriate types of 
structures and venues for transitional justice processes. Given the  
regional dimensions of many conflicts and associated crimes, and 
given the enormous amount of time and money expended on 
creating national and international mechanisms to address atrocities 
arising from conflicts, the opportunities and limitations of possible 
regional responses merit consideration.6 We see a need to evaluate 
how transitional justice processes might be used by regional actors or 
in a regionalized way, given the regionalized elements of conflict and 
the presence of regional political configurations, institutions and 
mechanisms which might be utilized to promote accountability.7 We 
begin by examining existing experiences with regionalized conflict 
management, recognizing the critical distinction between conflict 
management processes and accountability processes.
 In this article, we consider possible regionalized responses—
peace agreements and accountability mechanisms—to  transnational 
conflicts and human rights violations.  We focus on past regional 
initiatives for conflict resolution and the possibility of related 
accountability mechanisms for addressing past human rights 
violations.   We pay particular attention to capacities, as yet largely 
underexploited, and limitations, of regional organizations in 
peacemaking and accountability.8 Where might “regional” responses 
 
6 For an explicit argument for a regional approach to designing transitional justice 
mechanisms, see Matiangai Sirleaf, “Regional Approach to Transitional Justice? 
Examining the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission for Liberia,” Florida Journal of International Law  vol. 21 (2009): 209-284. 
7 We stop short of arguing ‘for’ regional transitional justice mechanisms, which we 
consider premature, given the limitations of such mechanisms even for single 
country situations, and lack of sufficient evidence regarding how they might work.   
Rather than arguing ‘for’ the use of regional transitional justice mechanisms, we 
seek to contribute to transitional justice research by identifying how the relative 
lack of regional mechanisms contributes to the impunity gap.   
8 United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More 
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be appropriate, specifically for transnational violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law?  
 We analyze regional responses without assuming that the 
'region' is simply a middle space, in terms of scale, between the 
national and the international. We recognize that ‘regions’ themselves 
are geographic fictions, defined by social convention or the existence 
of formal mechanisms and alliances.  Reifying the region as in some 
sense between the national and international (or the ‘local’ and the 
‘global’) runs the risk of a simplistic analysis in which the problems of 
the international (too far away, too removed from the context) and 
the problems of the national (too much impunity, too much 
willingness to settle for amnesty) are 'fixed' through the compromise 
of the region.9  
 The presumption that regional responses will be less partial, 
more legitimate and/or more effective may simply be wrong, given 
the regional dimensions of many conflicts. However, while regional 
politics may share many of the problems that affect  ‘local’ and/or  
‘global’ politics, the existence of numerous regional and subregional 
bodies with various degrees of institutional capacity suggests that at 
least some may have the potential to address conflict and demands 
for accountability.10    We treat regions and subregions here largely as 
formal and informal groupings as they self-define rather than 
introducing any new conception of either level, thus accepting the 
African Union as a regional organization and the Economic 
Community of West African States as a subregional organization.11  
What we consider here is whether regional groupings, ad hoc or 
formalized, could facilitate both peace and accountability processes in 
situations of transnational or regionalized conflict.  We address the 
 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004) at 
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf, paras. 33 and 94, notes the UN has 
failed to use the potential of such organizations sufficiently. 
9 See for example Richard Burchill “Regional approaches to International 
Humanitarian Law,” Victoria University Wellington Law Review vol. 41 (2010): 205-233.   
10 A More Secure World, paras. 265-73.  
11 We are grateful for an anonymous reviewer’s directions to make explicit how we 
are treating the central concepts of regional and subregional.  
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possible virtues of regional initiatives, in that some of those involved 
might have a greater stake in addressing conflict and past abuses, and 
the fact that the international security architecture has increasingly 
elaborated regional and sub-regional organizations. The United 
Nations has also increasingly developed regional approaches. We 
recognize the pitfalls of regional approaches, including the potential 
intransigence of many state parties and proxies involved in conflicts 
and abuses, which could bias or simply block accountability 
mechanisms or peace negotiations at a regional level.  
 The article proceeds in the following manner. We consider 
existing regional approaches to conflict resolution and seek to 
identify how or where they might address accountability as well.  
There are, to date, relatively few regionalized peace processes and 
even fewer efforts at regionalized accountability processes.12 We 
discuss two specific instances of regionalized peace negotiations to 
illustrate options for and limitations to regionalized peace and justice 
mechanisms. We examine the early development of regional 
responses in Central America from the 1980s onwards, and the later 
regional mechanisms developed in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) from the late 1990s to the present.  The experiences of 
these countries are instructive, as each experienced regional conflict 
and regional involvement in peace agreements, without regional 
criminal accountability mechanisms to date.  
 Drawing from this empirical discussion, we then consider 
whether the current options in the ‘toolkit’ for  post-conflict or post-
atrocity accountability might be used regionally. Can the mechanisms 
currently in use, such as truth commissions, amnesties, and criminal 
trials, work at a regional level?  
 We seek here to identify ways to promote peace with 
justice—challenging enough in any situation—but in an explicitly 
 
12 Even in a regional court designed to address human rights abuses (such as the 
Inter-American Court or the European Court of Human Rights), the activities are 
confined to addressing state responsibility for breaches of their international legal 
obligations.  In contrast, we explore the possibility for regional approaches to 
address individual responsibility, through criminal prosecution or other 
accountability mechanisms. 
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regional context. Most obviously, a regional response by definition 
would involve a multi-state negotiation. We can presume any solution 
might also include, at least in part, mechanisms that have been 
utilized in ‘purely domestic’ processes.  These include, although they 
are certainly not limited to:  criminal accountability, truth and 
reconciliation processes, traditional justice, vetting, limited or total 
amnesties, and accountability processes with pardons.  Can such 
‘tools’ simply be transposed from the national or international arenas 
to a regional process, or are some of these options better suited than 
others for regional peace and justice processes? 13 What is the range of 
accountability options that might be considered, either during or after 
a peace process, and how might these function in a transnational or 
regional context? 
  
Conceiving of solutions: Regional approaches to conflict 
management 
The international security architecture is increasingly attuned to the 
regional dimension of conflict, and might provide institutional 
support for regional approaches to peace and justice. Precisely 
because of the regionalized or transnational nature of many conflicts, 
neighbouring states often have a security interest in containing and 
terminating conflicts in the neighbourhood.  Regional powers may 
promote mediation, or regional organizations may facilitate peace 
negotiations, in order to reduce the risk that conflict will spread and 
seek to end existing conflicts.   
 There are a range of institutions and mechanisms operating 
 
13 Critiques of the concept of the ‘toolkit’ rightly observe that imagining an ideal 
model, be it a truth commission or tribunal, and expecting such a formula to work 
equally in disparate circumstances (for example, South Africa and Peru, or Sierra 
Leone and Cambodia) ignores the specificity or particular situations.  For an 
excellent discussion/critique of the polemics of the ‘techniques’ of transitional 
justice –creating ‘toolkits’ and deploying models—see Christopher J. Colvin, 
“Purity and Planning: Shared Logics of Transitional Justice and Development,”  
International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 2 (2008): 412-425. In this article, we 
seek to ‘transpose tools’ in a different way, by discussing how mechanisms that 
operate in nations or internationally might function if given a ‘regional’ 
geographical assignment. 
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at the regional level to address conflict, which might be utilized to 
develop accountability processes at a regional level. These include 
regional mechanisms and offices created by the United Nations and 
regional and subregional organizations. Most of these institutions or 
mechanisms are relatively new.14  Examples are myriad, ranging from 
the role played by the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) in supporting peace negotiations leading to 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan to the role played by 
the African Union in mediating electoral conflict in Kenya.15 On the 
other hand, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
has had little success in addressing the strife and repression in 
Zimbabwe.16
 The UN system, for example, has developed a regional 
peace-building support office in the Great Lakes region, and there is 
a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa.17  
The UN Development Programme has active regional centres in 
 
14  On regional conflict, and regional approaches to conflict prevention and 
resolution see Chandra Lekha Sriram and Zoe Nielsen, eds., Exploring subregional 
conflict: Opportunities for conflict prevention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Peter 
Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed conflict and regional conflict 
complexes, 1989-1997,” Journal of Peace Research vol. 35, no. 5 (September 1998): 
621-634. 
15 On the role of IGAD in the Sudanese peace process, see John Young, “IGAD 
and the North-South Sudan Peace Process,” Sudan Tribune (15 October 2007) at 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24243 and United Nations Mission 
in Sudan, “Comprehensive Peace Agreements,” at 
http://www.unmis.org/English/cpa.htm. The peace process is discussed in greater 
detail in Chandra Lekha Sriram, Peace as governance: Power-sharing, armed groups, and 
contemporary peace negotiations (London: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2008), chapter 4.  
“African Union head meets Kenya’s feuding parties,” (9 January 2008), at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/9d9f604c-bea6-11dc-8c61-0000779fd2ac.html.  
16  Arrigo Pallotti, “The political limits of regional conflict prevention in Southern 
Africa:  
SADC and the crisis of Zimbabwe,” at 
http://eadi.org/database/?dataset=egc2005&table=data&id=72 (2005).  
17 “United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Support missions,” at 
http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/ppbm.pdf; see also the website of the UN 
Office for West Africa, at http://www.un.org/unowa/.  
 
8
Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss1/8
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2012.1.1.2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11   Closing Impunity Gaps  
 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1,Iss.1, 2012, 3-30 
                                                
Bangkok and Colombo as part of its regional bureau for Asia and the 
Pacific, as well as centres for southern Africa and Europe.18  The 
UN’s Mediation Support Unit, created in response to a 
recommendation of the UN High Level Panel report, and operating 
as part of the UN Department of Political Affairs, might promote 
cooperation with regional organizations, many of which have sought 
to develop their own conflict prevention or resolution mechanisms, 
and several of which have member states which are also subject to a 
regional human rights court.19  
 Most of the non-UN multilateral organizations or 
mechanisms involve geographically contiguous countries.  However, 
some organizations include non-contiguous countries, which are 
creations of multilateral alliances, artefacts of colonialism, or self-
defined communities of identity.20  The former have generally 
developed greater human rights and conflict resolution mechanisms 
than the latter. However, regional organizations have emphasized 
conflict resolution and prevention capacity over human rights 
mechanisms, and where human rights mechanisms exist they are 
largely focused upon state obligations rather than individual criminal 
accountability. 
 Numerous mechanisms to address conflict have been 
developed in Africa, albeit with various degrees of robustness. The 
African Union’s (AU) Constitutive Act of 2000 emphasizes conflict 
prevention and promotion of stability, and in 2002 the organization 
created an early warning system to facilitate collective responses to 
 
18 See the regional bureau’s page at 
http://www.undp.org/rbap/ResourceCentre2.htm; see the listings of other 
regional bureaus and “SURFS” at 
http://www.undp.org/energyandenvironment/regsurf.htm (last accessed 29 March 
2007). 
19 See DPA webpage on peacemaking at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/peace.html (Last accessed 13 April 2007); Centre 
for Conflict Resolution, United Nations Mediation Experience in Africa workshop 
report (Cape Town, October 2006). 
20 Many of these are treated as “regional arrangements” under Chapter VIII of the 
United Nations Charter nonetheless, and for the sake of simplicity are termed 
regional organizations here. 
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conflict and crisis.21  Subregional organizations such as the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS ) and IGAD have 
developed conflict prevention mechanisms and even in some cases 
deployed peacekeeping missions as ECOWAS did in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia, and have developed conflict prevention mechanisms.22 
IGAD created the Conflict and Early Warning Response Mechanism 
in 2000, while ECOWAS states reached a protocol on the creation of 
a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, 
peacekeeping, and security in 1999.23 None of these processes, 
institutions, or developments means that regional holistic processes 
will be easy, or even feasible, but rather may provide some insights as 
to where to start.  
 A range of conflict resolution, mitigation, and prevention 
mechanisms exist in Latin America, Asia, and Europe as well. 
Organization of American States members agreed to the Inter-
American Democratic Charter in September 2001, which seeks to lay 
the foundations for peaceful coexistence among democratic states.  
The OAS pledged its commitment to representative democracy and 
aid to democracies that are weak,  and the imposition of sanctions on 
members that violate basic principles of democracy.24 In Europe, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe includes both a 
 
21 African Union, “Meeting of Governmental Experts on Early Warning and 
Conflict Prevention,” AU Doc. PSD/EW/EXP/2(1) (December 2006).   
22 See, for example, Comfort Ero, “ECOWAS and the subregional peacekeeping in 
Liberia,” Journal of Humanitarian Affairs (September 2005), at 
http://www.jha.ac/articles/a005.htm.  
23 On the IGAD mechanism, see http://www.cewarn.org/; for ECOWAS, see 
“Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security,” at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/62/38873520.pdf.  Sirleaf, “Regional 
Approach to Transitional Justice?” 275,  suggests transitional justice responses 
might be leveraged into existing institutions such as human rights courts and 
conflict prevention units within regional arrangements. See also Richard Burchill, 
“Regional Approaches to International Humanitarian Law,” Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review vol. 41 (2010): 205-233. 
24 Available at http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm; see 
generally Stephen Baranyi, “Inter-American Institutions and Conflict Prevention,” 
FOCAL Policy Paper FPP-05-04, (March 2005), available at www.focal.ca.  
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Conflict Prevention Centre and the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, whose role is cast as a conflict-mitigating one.25 The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) created the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, but in general the member states prefer 
policies of non-interference in one another’s internal affairs, greatly 
hampering the resolution of crises such as that in Burma since its 
takeover by the military junta which renamed it Myanmar.26
 Regional human rights courts such as the European Court 
of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, while focused on state 
obligations rather than individual criminal accountability, might 
speculatively offer a neutral venue for identifying regionalized human 
rights abuses.27  They have yet to do so although the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has addressed abuses that took place in 
regionalized conflicts without specifically addressing that dimension, 
as noted below.  The African Union Panel on Darfur proposed in 
October 2009 that a hybrid criminal court be created to adjudicate 
crimes in Darfur, with Sudanese and non-Sudanese staff nominated 
by criteria to be developed by the African Union. 28 The report 
emphasized that the ICC was a court of last resort and that it would 
be preferable for crimes to be addressed by national courts where 
 
25 See OSCE, “Secretariat—Conflict Prevention Centre,” at 
http://www.osce.org/cpc/13077.html; see also High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, “HCNM Approach to Conflict Prevention,” at 
http://www1.osce.org/hcnm/23628.html.  
26 On the ASEAN Regional Forum, see www.aseanregionalforum.org; see also 
Aung Zaw, “ASEAN-Burma Relations,” (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2000) at 
http://www.idea.int/asia_pacific/burma/upload/chap1.pdf.  
27    On the African court, see the website of the African Court of Human and 
Peoples Rights, at http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/court_en.html (last 
accessed 29 March 2007) and the website of the African Court Coalition, at 
www.africancourtcoalition.org (last accessed 9 January 2008); for the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and related commission, see 
www.oas.org/oaspage/humanrights.htm (last accessed 9 January 2008); and for the 
European Court of Human Rights, see www.echr.coe.int/ECHR (last accessed 9 
January 2008). 
28 Former South African President Thabo Mbeki chaired the panel, which was 
established by the African Union in 2008 to investigate the Darfur crisis. 
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possible, consistent with the principle of complementarity.29   
 Certain regional organizations have not yet developed 
formalized conflict prevention, much less human rights and 
accountability, capacities.  These include the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, the Arab League, the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation, and La Francophonie. The 
Commonwealth purports to promote human rights and good 
governance, but does not have formalized capacities in accountability 
or conflict resolution.30 Such regional or specialized organizations 
might be better-placed to address regionalized abuses not only 
because they can address their transborder character, but also, in 
principle, because they are better-attuned to local political, social and 
legal dynamics and have greater legitimacy with member states; 
whether this is in fact the case is beyond the scope of the current 
discussion.31
 
Regional peace agreements without regional transitional justice 
mechanisms 
Obviously peace agreements involving multiple states are not new 
phenomena—multi-state conflicts usually end, if not in pure military 
defeat and surrender, in multi-party peace agreements. Where 
conflicts have been characterized as “internal,” peace agreements are 
usually negotiated and signed in a national context involving multiple 
parties within the state, but seldom external parties, despite the role 
of external actors in funding, arming, or otherwise supporting 
internal combatants, or the role of external fighters in another state’s 
 
29 African Union, “Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur 
(AUPD)” PSC/AHG/2(CCV) (October 2009) paras. 320-336, 339. 
30 See the website for the Commonwealth, at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/.  
Of course it is debatable whether either La Francophonie or the Commonwealth 
ought to be characterized as regional organizations as many member states are not 
contiguous with one another.  
31 Richard Burchill, “Regional Approaches to International Humanitarian Law,” 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review vol. 41 (2010): 205-233, argues that the 
regional level “occupies a unique space between the ‘discreteness of the state and 
the undifferentiated international system’,” .210.  
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conflict.   Including external actors in a peace agreement for an 
ostensibly internal conflict would obviously be politically and 
logistically challenging, but it is not unheard of.  A process leading to 
such an agreement might involve representatives of several states, of 
armed groups both inside and outside the state or states most 
affected by conflict, and a range of facilitators or mediators.  As 
discussed below, such processes have been rare; the process in the 
DRC offers the clearest contemporary example. Any peace 
agreement would necessarily need to address a range of issues, from 
conflict termination to the disposition of former fighters, and 
consideration of the demands and grievances by multiple parties, as 
well as calls for reparation or accountability by the populations 
affected.  What then are the particular challenges for regional 
peacemaking that includes accountability? 
 Processes in Central America and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo provide two important examples of regionalized 
peacemaking and non-regionalized accountability mechanisms, the 
former of an earlier experiment and the latter an ongoing process.  In 
both instances, we see concrete, and marginally successful, conflict 
resolution processes, but little or no effort to design regionalized 
accountability responses. They represent two of the three options for 
regional responses discussed above: regional involvement in peace 
processes, and regionalized institutional processes.32   These two key 
case studies of regional conflict and peacemaking reveal the 
possibilities and challenges of regional approaches to conflict 
resolution alongside  accountability.  
 
 
32 We do not consider other situations in which there have been regionalized 
conflict and regional peacekeeping responses, such as the efforts by ECOWAS in 
several countries in West Africa, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia.  This is because 
while important peacekeeping operations were carried out by a regional 
organization, they did not entail either regional peace negotiations/agreements or 
regionalized considerations of options for accountability.  We are grateful to the 
comments by an anonymous reviewer suggesting the inclusion of a study of other 
regionalized conflict formations, such as those in West Africa, for prompting the 
refinement of this point. 
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Central America 
The nations that comprise the region of Central America have a 
shared history of conquest and armed conflict. Further, they are tied 
together not only by their coterminous physical localities on the 
isthmus, but also by the degree to which they have been subject to 
influence and intervention by the United States.33  The region 
experienced acute periods of violence, particular in the 1980s in 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. The United States was 
involved in all of the violent conflicts in Central America, most 
obviously in its support for the government in El Salvador and the 
contras seeking the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, and in 
significant ways in Guatemala.  This violence affected peoples and 
politics throughout the region, particularly the flow of refugees, the 
support in some territories of armed insurgencies directed against 
neighbours, and the fear that cross-border connections would 
generate further violence.  Attempts at conflict resolution in the 
region during the 1980s were promoted by leaders within the region 
and close neighbours, but not formally the United States. 
 Although the conflicts in Central America could be 
considered and were often discussed as internal conflicts, a number 
of countries on the borders of, and therefore affected by, the 
violence sought a regional approach to conflict resolution.  In 1983, 
the presidents of Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Panama met 
with the stated purpose of contributing to the resolution of these 
conflicts through the “Contadora” initiative.  The initiative produced 
a draft peace act for the region in 1984, which was quickly abandoned 
following heavy US criticism. However, the precedent for a regional 
approach to addressing the Central American conflicts was 
established.  Soon after, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias launched 
an initiative to pursue negotiated settlements of the region’s conflicts.  
In 1987, the Esquipulas II accord was reached, which committed the 
 
33 George Black, Milton Jamail and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala 
(New York: New York Monthly Review Press, 1984), and James Dunkerley, Power in 
the Isthmus; A Political History of Modern Central America (London: Verso, 1988).  See also 
Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Dynamics of Conflict in Central America,” in Sriram and 
Nielsen, eds., Exploring subregional conflict. 
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nations of the region to open internal dialogues between belligerent 
parties, and to the principle of democratic rule. The Esquipulas 
Accords explicitly tied concessions made in one nation to agreements 
by others in the region.  Furthermore, the process that produced the 
Esquipulas Accords was unique in that the US, then a highly 
influential actor in the region, remained at least officially on the 
sidelines.34 While the Contadora and Esquipulas processes have been 
viewed as important confidence-building measures, it is critical to 
note that they failed to achieve resolution to any of the Central 
American conflicts, and that the successful peace processes that 
ensued were domestic ones with international support.   
 During the regional conflict resolution processes in Central 
America, there was no discussion of  the possibility of prosecuting 
perpetrators of serious abuses at the level of the region, nor indeed 
was there a discussion of domestic prosecutions.  However, it is 
worth noting that throughout much of the conflicts in the region, 
and through the peace processes, there were ‘regional’ bodies 
addressing gross violations of human rights.  The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (hereafter, “the Commission”) 
conducts investigations into human rights abuses in the region and 
may refer cases to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which 
has the capacity not to try individuals for abuses, but to identify state 
derogations from their legal obligations to respect human rights. 35 
An early instance of the Inter-American Court passing judgment on 
state abuses in the context of internal repression was the judgment 
against Honduras in the Velasquez-Rodriguez case of 1988.36 However, 
the Inter-American Court has had its limitations. El Salvador has 
staunchly resisted both institutions.37  Successive Guatemalan 
 
34 Sriram, “Dynamics of conflict in Central America, 142. 
35 For the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, see 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/, and for the Inter-American Court of Human rights, 
see http://www.cidh.org/  
36 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C) 
No. 4 (1988), available at  http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_12d.htm.  
37 Benjamin Cuellar Martinez, “Chapter Two: El Salvador,” in Victims Unsilenced: 
The Inter-American Human Rights System and Transitional Justice in Latin America, 
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regimes have also failed to comply with court judgements.  A rare 
exception was its response to the case involving the Dos Erres 
massacre, as the government began pursuing settlements rather than 
awaiting decisions by the Court.38   
 While the Inter-American Court as a regional body has been 
proactive and not without influence, states have often failed to 
implement key elements of Court decisions. As a result, some victims 
have recently brought civil cases in the United States under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act, and criminal charges have been brought in Spain 
through the exercise of universal jurisdiction.39 Generally, there has 
been very little individual criminal accountability for the massive 
human rights violence in Central America within national judicial 
systems, and none regionally. 
 
 
(Washington, DC: Due Process of Law Foundation, 2007).  Cuellar writes that 
“successive governments before and during the civil war blatantly disregarded the 
Commission’s indications and made sure to sidestep any difficult situation,” 37. 
38 Marcie Mersky and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Chapter One: Guatemala,” in Victims 
Unsilenced. The IACHR has overseen amicable settlements in some 80 cases, 
including that of Dos Erres, and the Inter-American Court has issued rulings in 11 
cases (Ibid. at 8). Among the most prominent are the  Myrna Mack case, in which a 
Guatemalan anthropologist was assassinated in 1990, Myrna Mack Chang v. 
Guatemala, Judgement of November 25, 2003, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. Ser. C, No. 101, 
pars. 65-116. Another critical case was the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. 
Merits. Judgment of April 29, 2004, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.. Series C No. 105 addressing 
an incident in which 268 villagers were murdered by army troops in 1982 as a part 
of the army’s counterinsurgency, ‘scorched earth’ campaign. See Mersky and Roht-
Arriaza, “Chapter One,” 7-9. 
39 In January 2006, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a $54.6 million 
jury verdict against Generals Jose Guillermo Garcia and Carlos Eugenio Vides 
Casanova, two former Salvadoran Ministers of Defense.  On the decision in Spain 
regarding alleged genocide in Guatemala, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Guatemala 
Genocide Case.  Judgement no. STC 237/2005,” The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 100, No. 1 (January 2006): 207-213. 
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The DRC 
The conflict in the DRC has been complex and multi-faceted, 
particularly because of the regional dimensions of both the conflict 
and conflict resolution efforts. Neighbouring states are both sources 
of and affected by the violence in the DRC, with cross-border flows 
of arms, resources, and persons both enriching and destabilizing 
certain sectors.  Elsewhere, we have discussed the violent conflict in 
the DRC and specifically the transnational elements to the 
commission of serious international crimes, and the responses to 
such crimes.40  Our focus, in that discussion, was on accountability 
mechanisms at the international level, specifically the intervention of 
the International Criminal Court, as well as significant gaps in 
accountability within the DRC and the region.  Our purpose here, 
however, is to focus on the regional dimensions of conflict resolution 
efforts in DRC and the absence of concomitant accountability 
mechanisms at the regional level.  How have regional instruments 
and agreements facilitated or impeded accountability for atrocity?  
And based on that experience, how might regional instruments be 
mobilized to promote peace with justice? 
 As is well-known, armies, militias, rebel groups, and refugees 
of several neighbouring states operated (and in some cases continue 
to operate) on the territory of the DRC during what came to be 
known as “Africa’s World War”.  However, regional involvement 
entailed not only destabilization, but also attempts to mediate what 
was treated as an internal conflict, and/or the involvements of 
neighbouring belligerents as parties to peace processes. In July 1999, 
the DRC, along with Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and 
Uganda, signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.41  In somewhat 
expansive and possibly contradictory terms, the Lusaka Agreement 
acknowledges national sovereignty as well as the regional dimensions 
of the conflict in the DRC. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement further 
references Article 52 of the UN Charter, which treats regional 
 
40 Sriram and Ross, ”Geographies of crime and justice”. 
41 See Africa Fact Files webpage, DRC page, (last accessed 28 August 2009). 
http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/drcongo/icd/index.htm. 
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arrangements and responses as appropriate for “matters relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security.”   
 Regional actors also supported the process of the Inter-
Congolese dialogue, which resulted in power-sharing agreement for a 
transitional government in 2003.42  These regional initiatives and the 
deployment of the UN peacekeeping force MONUC have, arguably, 
promoted limited resolution of conflict amongst some but not all key 
protagonists.  The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was followed by 
separate accords between the DRC and the Rwandan and Ugandan 
governments, in which these states agreed to withdraw troops from 
the territory of the DRC. The 2003 Agreement helped lead to 
elections in 2006, considered successful despite significant violence 
and irregularities.43  Countries of the region have formed the 
Tripartite Plus Joint Commission, comprising Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, seeking to 
improve dialogue and address conflict, and particularly share 
information on the transnational movements of rebel groups.44 The 
United Nations has also taken an increasingly regionalized approach 
to the conflict, with the UN Security Council increasingly focused 
upon conflict in the Great Lakes rather than individual countries.45   
 The regional agreements that facilitated the transitional 
government and the resultant elections can be considered to have 
limited success in that some power-sharing agreements were reached, 
but failures are also readily apparent.  The most obvious indication of 
the failure of these mechanisms is the resumption and, indeed, the 
escalation of violence at the time of this writing.  Although peace 
 
42 See Global Policy Forum, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/congo/2002/0426dialogue.htm. (last 
accessed 28 August 2009)  
43 See Human Rights Watch http://hrw.org/doc/?t=africa&c=congo (last accessed 
9 January 2008). 
44 Jim Fisher-Thompson, “Tripartite Peace Process Tackles Tough Issues at Kigali 
Meeting,” (26 May 2006), at http://usinfo.state.gov/af/Archive/2006/May/26-
571712.html.  
45 See Global Policy Forum, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kongidx.htm. 
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agreements have been implemented in the DRC, the violence in the 
eastern departments (Ituri, North and South Kivus) has intensified.  
Hundreds of thousands have been displaced and remain in insecure 
and inadequately supported camps, resulting in additional high 
mortality rates.46
 While regional approaches to and participation in conflict 
resolution in the DRC and the region have been significant (if not 
always successful) regional approaches to criminal accountability for 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have 
been notably absent. Although the agreements that led to the 
transitional power-sharing government and subsequent elections 
prohibited amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide, many of the rebel leaders accused of precisely such crimes 
were included in the transitional government.  While the ICC has 
indicted two Congolese nationals, the conflict in the DRC involved 
the intervention, both directly and indirectly, by several neighbouring 
governments, most notably Uganda and Rwanda, officials of which 
might well be responsible for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.  To date, the ICC Prosecutor has yet to indict Rwandan or 
Ugandan officials, despite those states’ extensive intervention in the 
Ituri region.47  
 Regional involvement in the commission of the violence and 
crimes in the DRC conflict has been significant.  Regional 
participation in negotiating resolution to the violence has also been 
significant.  But, to date, the role of regional instruments in pursuing 
criminal accountability has been missing, and, indeed, the political 
agreements reached have left offenders in positions to continue 
possible violence. In each region discussed above (Central America 
and Central Africa), a mixture of self-interest and political necessity 
encouraged states party to regionalized and internal conflicts to 
consider regionalized agreements to address them.  The fact that they 
stopped short of developing accountability mechanisms may indicate 
either the degree to which state officials still in power are willing to 
 
46 Ibid. 
47 Sriram and Ross, “Geographies of crime and justice.” 
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put themselves at risk of trial, or the lack of political will at the 
international level to pressure them to do so.  Whether regional 
processes are feasible for conflict resolution and accountability for 
abuses in the DRC remains to be seen. 
 
Conceiving possible solutions:  how might regional transitional 
justice mechanisms close the impunity gap? 
We are aware that just as it would be dangerous to take a cookie-
cutter approach and simply transfer a transitional justice 
mechanism/approach from one country to another without adapting 
it to the local context, mechanisms used domestically might not be 
easily modified to operate regionally.  However, we seek to consider 
how a regional approach to transitional justice might in principle 
function, as regional formations can and do impact both peace 
processes and the negotiations involving accountability for past 
human rights violations.  Which of the standard transitional justice 
and accountability ‘tools’ might be utilized in a regional or 
transnational context?   
 
Criminal accountability   
In principle, it would be appropriate to impose criminal 
accountability in response to transnational or regional human rights 
violations.  Transnational crimes could thus be punished in the same 
manner as crimes deemed to be purely domestic, where jurisdiction 
exists.   The International Criminal Court can hear cases pertaining to 
all parties to a conflict (or those complicit in abuses) if each is a 
national of a state party or commits a crime on the territory of a state 
party (or if the UN Security Council refers the situation).  However, it 
has not yet chosen to do so, notwithstanding the obvious regional 
aspects to the conflicts and crimes committed in the DRC, where 
Rwandan or Ugandan officials, or indeed officials of foreign 
corporations, might well have committed certain crimes. Indeed, 
while a former Vice-President of the DRC, Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, has been arrested for crimes he is alleged to have committed 
in the Central African Republic, he will be tried not for more 
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regionalized crimes but for those in that country specifically.48 
Alternatively, a regional court, whether permanent or ad hoc, might be 
developed to hear cases involving regional conflicts and crimes.  The 
United States initially advocated that an African hybrid tribunal be set 
up to address crimes in Darfur, albeit as part of its long-standing 
campaign against the ICC.49 Obviously, any ad hoc regional court or 
prosecution process would require state consent, which might be 
very difficult to obtain. Thus, while in principle a regionalized 
approach to accountability would be useful, significant legal and 
political obstacles remain. 
 
Truth Commissions   
In principle, truth and reconciliation processes that addressed 
conflicts and abuses across borders, or in a regional context, could be 
designed.  In practice, official truth commissions, mandated by 
governments, have most often been designed to address crimes in a 
national context.  Indeed, truth commissions to date have a decidedly 
national emphasis, as they most often appear as the result of 
compromises taken in the context of national peace negotiations. Yet 
truth commissions and their reports can also address regional 
dynamics: the final report of the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) included an extended discussion 
of the role of external actors, and the Guatemalan Commission for 
Historical Clarification devoted extensive attention to external events 
that set the context for violence in that country.50  However, the 
Sierra Leonean TRC was not designed to hear evidence from actors 
 
48 International Criminal Court, Press Release, “Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo arrested 
for crimes allegedly committed in the Central African Republic,”  ICC-CPI-
20080524-PR315 (24 May 2008). 
49 Remarks of US representative Mrs. Patterson at the meeting of the UN Security 
Council that approved resolution 1593, referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC, 
UN Doc. S/PV.5158 (31 March 2005). 
50  Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, vol. 3b, (2004) 
available at: http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3b-c2.shtml. See also 
Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Historico, (1999) Guatemala: Memory of Silence, 
Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, 
http://hrdata.aaas.org/ceh/report.  
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outside the country, or about abuses outside the country; alternatively 
the Liberian truth commission was designed to hear testimony 
regarding abuses in Liberia, but not elsewhere despite the regional 
nature of the conflict, although it did hear testimony from the 
Liberian diaspora in the region and in North America.51 Given the 
linked nature of these and other conflicts in the region, perhaps a 
regionalized process would be appropriate, but (as with prosecutions) 
would require the elusive state consent, at least for an official 
commission.52 Further, any such commission could be costly and 
involve complicated logistics to operate across borders in countries 
with infrastructure already severely damaged by conflict, and with 
enduring security problems. Efforts by national NGOs to create a 
regional commission of inquiry in the Balkans have proceeded slowly, 
and organizers anticipate opposition from the president of Republika 
Srpska despite the significant passage of time since the end of the 
conflict. However, the campaign to persuade the parliaments of each 
state of the former Yugoslavia to pass legislation enabling the 
creation of a single cross-national commission would, if successful, 
create a novel type of institution.53
 
Traditional justice   
 
51 Laura A. Young and Rosalyn Park, “Engaging Diasporas in Truth Commissions: 
Lessons from the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” International 
Journal of Transitional Justice vol. 3, no. 3 (2009): 341-361.  The truth commission in 
Haiti also took statements from Diaspora populations in North America, see David 
A. Hoogenboom and Joanna R. Quinn, “Transitional Justice and the Diaspora: 
Examining the Impact of the Haitian Diaspora on the Haitian Truth Commission,” 
(working paper 2011), at 
http://politicalscience.uwo.ca/faculty/quinn/TransitionalJustice_Diaspora_haitian
_truth_commission_2_.pdf.  
52 Sirleaf, “Regional approach to transitional justice?” 229-271. 
53 Gordana Andric and Eldin Hadzovic, “REKOM Initiative Collects Signatures 
Across Balkans,” Balkan Insight  (26 April 2011) at 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/million-signatures-for-the-victims-of-
balkan-wars. Humanitarian Law Centre, “RECOM Process: Results and 
Prospective [sic]” (8 July 2011) at  http://www.hlc-
rdc.org/Saopstenja/2060.en.html  
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Traditional justice processes are often also linked to local, culturally-
specific conflict resolution processes, but might in principle be useful 
routes to pursue accountability for serious abuses regionally as well as 
domestically.  Traditional justice activities have been utilized in 
Rwanda and East Timor, where the formal judicial sector could not 
manage the volume of cases.  However, such activities risk losing 
their ‘traditional’ character, becoming more formalized and 
institutionalized.54 In practice, traditional justice mechanisms have 
proven problematic for a variety of reasons, including abuse of 
process, failure to meet international human rights standards, the 
dominance of certain groups, and, in particular, the exclusion of 
women from decision-making. This does not mean that such 
processes are useless, but rather that caution should be exercised. 
Further, the local nature of these processes may render them 
inappropriate to address conflicts that spill across borders, given that 
traditional justice processes generally take place at a local, and often 
solely intra-group, level.  These mechanisms usually emerge from and 
are conducted by specific local communities and may thus be 
inappropriate to use outside of such specific contexts even within a 
state, much less in a transnational setting. 
 
Vetting  
It seems relatively unlikely that vetting would be pursued in a 
regionalized fashion, given that vetting procedures involve a complex 
of internal legislative and bureaucratic decisions and regulations.  
Such measures involve policies regarding exclusion from government 
service, including in the security sector, and in key professional roles, 
as doctors, teachers, or lawyers.55 While it is theoretically possible 
 
54    Jeremy Sarkin, “The tension between justice and reconciliation in Rwanda:  
Politics, Human Rights, due process and the role of the gacaca courts in dealing with 
the genocide,” Journal of African Law, vol. 45, no. 2 (2001): 143 – 172; Tanja Hohe 
and Rod Nixon, Reconciling Justice: ‘Traditional’ Law and State Judiciary in East Timor, 
United States Institute for Peace Final Report (January 2003).    
55  UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Vetting: An 
Operational Framework,” (2006) at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-
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that vetting arrangements could be operationalized transnationally, 
and enshrined in peace agreements alongside agreements regarding 
ceasefires and troop withdrawals, governments are likely to consider 
these decisions a sovereign preserve and resist such discussions. 
 
Limited or total amnesties, and accountability processes with pardons  
As noted above, blanket amnesties are not binding on international 
or foreign courts, and the United Nations rejects them.  Limited or 
conditional amnesties, or prosecutions with pardons or reduced 
sentences, have been viewed somewhat more positively, although 
with significant concerns.  Examples include the so-called exchange 
of truth for justice in the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, which provided for individualized amnesty, predicated 
on the Amnesty Committee’s approval.  This ‘carrot’—amnesty 
offered in exchange for honesty—was theoretically reinforced by the 
‘stick’ of the threat of prosecutions of those refusing to testify.56 TRC 
processes could be regionalized, subject to state consent, however 
amnesties may be less likely to be accepted internationally. 
 As discussed above, with the exception of vetting, and 
traditional justice, regional approaches might be feasible—in 
principle, subject to state consent.  But what are the odds that states 
would consent?  That is to say, could a mediator reasonably expect to 
promote a regional peace with justice process in the context of 
regional conflict formations, in light of the many competing interests, 
 
Vetting_en.pdf; Kathleen E. Smith, “Decommunization after the ‘Velvet 
Revolutions’ in East Central Europe,” in Roht-Arriaza, ed., Impunity and Human 
Rights in International Law and Practice, 82-98; International Center for Transitional 
Justice resource page on “Vetting,” at http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/783.html (last 
accessed 29 January 2008).  
56 Amnesty applicants were required, at least formally, to testify regarding the crime 
committed.  Lynn Berat, “South Africa: Negotiating Change?” in Roht-Arriaza, ed., 
Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice,  267-80; Chandra 
LekhaSriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice Versus Peace in Times of 
Transition (London: Frank Cass, 2004) chapter 6. Amy Ross, “The Politics of Truth 
in Transition: Latin American influences on the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission," Politique Africaine, no. 92  (2003): 18-38. 
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fears, and agendas of numerous state and non-state actors?  The 
prospects seem slim, but worth considering.   
 Certainly, in many instances state or rebel leaders, barely able 
to reach agreement with each other within state borders, would be 
unlikely to come to agreement with multiple other states who may 
also have supported enemy groups, either about terms of cessation of 
fighting, or appropriate measures for accountability.  However, a few 
previous processes, such as those for the DRC, offer possible 
directions for a regionalized agreement.  So too might the 
commitments, albeit broad, made by neighbouring states in the 
regional responses to conflicts in Central America.  Both state leaders 
and rebel groups across borders are clearly likely to find it difficult to 
coordinate, where internal agreements have failed. However, there 
might be incentives for regional agreements for both.  Specifically, 
each might prefer an agreement which guarantees security against 
both internal and external enemies.  They might be less eager to agree 
to regional accountability processes, much as they are domestically. 
On the other hand, they might prefer the relative certainty of 
arrangements in which they might face accountability processes only 
once, rather than being subject to multiple processes over time in 
different countries. 
 Greater support for combined regionalized peace and justice 
processes might occur in a number of ways:  a) regional processes 
promoting peace processes or accountability, b) mechanisms for 
conflict prevention or resolution institutionalized in regional 
arrangements or regional UN practice, or c) more holistic 
regionalized peace processes or accountability mechanisms that more 
fully engage relevant regional actors. While there is experience with 
the first two types of processes, the more holistic approaches have 
not been developed as yet.  By more holistic, we mean mechanisms 
that might entail accountability and conflict resolution, in a way that 
involves all neighbouring or regional actors in a conflict with clear 
obligations in those processes. In principle, all states with 
involvement in a conflict could consent to participate in negotiations, 
whether under the auspices of a regional organization, a regional 
office of the UN, or some other mechanism. Such processes might 
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include representatives of all states which have had official 
involvement in the conflict as discussed above, whether through 
funding or arming combatants or sending fighters themselves, and 
those affected by the trans-border operations and movement of non-
state armed groups.  
 Topics for discussion in such processes might be those 
traditionally undertaken in negotiating an end to civil wars: the 
original sources of conflict, allocation of future political, security, and 
economic resources, boundary delimitations, and the redress of 
grievances which emerged during the course of the conflict.57  They 
could, however, also address whether or not to pursue accountability, 
and specific mechanisms to be utilized.  The key distinction would be 
that they would involve parties in multiple states, and state and non-
state actors.  In principle, such discussions could generate more 
comprehensive peace and accountability settlements.  However, as 
the number of states and potential negotiating parties increases, the 
prospect for chaos, withdrawal of parties, and the undue impact of 
spoilers increases.  This does not mean such processes are necessarily 
impossible, but that one should not be too sanguine about the 
prospects for their immediate success.   
 
Conclusions and implications 
Those who might seek to promote regionalized accountability have a 
range of options.58 We have considered a number of possible 
regional responses to conflict and human rights abuses, seeking also 
to identify how regional organizations might engage not only in 
conflict resolution but also in transitional justice processes.  In this 
article, we sought to consider whether it might be feasible and 
appropriate to use a number of transitional justice mechanisms, 
including truth commissions, amnesties, and trials, which (in existing 
practice) are currently designed to address past violence for single 
 
57 Barbara Walter, Committing to Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); 
Sriram, Peace as governance. 
58 Much as they do when they seek to support single-country peace or 
accountability processes,  see Sriram, Confronting past human rights violations. 
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countries.  
 While we do not assume that regions are in some sense 
primordial, we have outlined areas of regional practice in conflict 
prevention and accountability by self-defined regional groupings and 
formalized regional organizations.  There are a range of such 
practices and institutions, and in particular efforts at regionalized 
peacemaking in Central America in the 1980s and more recently in 
the DRC are illuminating when considering the potentials and 
polemics of regional approaches for achieving peace and criminal 
accountability.  Regional organizations play key roles in promoting 
peace negotiations—often in conflicts depicted as purely internal.  
Regional actors can and often should be actively involved in 
negotiations, not least because they may have played a significant role 
in the conflict and their absence may render national agreements 
irrelevant.  To date, they have been involved as mediators and 
facilitators of agreements, but seldom as participants with obligations. 
The process in the DRC is one notable exception, with limited 
success.  A more integrated approach of regional responses to 
transboundary conflicts, as well as to the abuses they engender, might 
be of use. 
 A number of findings have emerged from this examination, 
which do not give great cause for optimism with regard to the use of 
regional processes of transitional justice as a solution to the impunity 
gap.  There is no evidence to date of regional initiatives to promote 
criminal accountability, and the one regional human rights court fully 
operational in a significantly conflict-affected region, Latin America, 
has had limited impact on transitional justice processes there.  While 
regional peacemaking processes have shown some promise, they have 
thus far also excluded accountability mechanisms. If such measures 
are to be included, they might in theory include prosecutions, 
amnesties, or truth commissions, while traditional justice mechanisms 
and vetting may prove more problematic. However, we see little 
evidence of willingness of states to address accountability for gross 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law 
through regional processes.  Rather, the regional practices that have 
emerged focus upon state obligations rather than individual criminal 
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responsibility.   Thus, while regional approaches to peacemaking may 
yield some success, the potential for regional approaches to promote 
criminal accountability is as yet untested. To date there have been no 
serious regionalized accountability processes, even where conflict 
resolution processes have been regionalized.  
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